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ABSTRACT  
Despite the well-documented negative effects of anxiety on task-switching (switch costs), few studies have directly tested major theoretical 
assumptions about (a) the specific processing component of task-switching that is impaired by anxiety, (b) anxious individuals' strategies 
during task-switching, and (c) the mediating role of mind wandering in the relation between anxiety and task-switching. We addressed these 
issues using a stochastic diffusion model analysis and novel thought-probe technique in the task-switching paradigm. Our results suggest that 
the locus of impaired switch costs under state anxiety lies in the efficiency of task-set reconfiguration and not in proactive interference 
processing. Moreover, state anxiety was associated with impaired mixing costs, which are another crucial index of task-switching. We found 
only partial evidence for anxious individuals' proneness to compensatory strategies during task-switching. However, no evidence was found 
for a mediating role of task-unrelated thoughts and a moderating role of working memory in the relation between anxiety and task-switching. 
Our findings elucidate theoretical assumptions underlying anxiety and cognitive functioning. 
KEYWORDS: anxiety, stochastic diffusion model, task-switching, switch costs, mixing costs 
 
Research has suggested that anxiety is hugely disruptive 
to cognitive functioning, even when the task is not threatening 
(Edwards et al., 2015; Eysenck et al., 2007; Hartanto & Yang, 
2016b). This is generally true for either trait anxiety, which refers 
to a stable individual’s tendency to experience anxiety across 
various contexts, and state anxiety, which refers to an experience 
of apprehension in response to subjectively threatening events that 
have uncertain outcomes. In particular, studies that have examined 
the influence of anxiety on task-switching—the ability to switch 
back and forth between multiple tasks, operations, or mental sets 
(Monsell, 2003)—have reported that high levels of trait or state 
anxiety were associated with impaired task-switching performance 
when assessed in terms of response time (RT), but not accuracy 
(Ansari et al., 2008; Derakshan et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2015). 
To our best knowledge, however, no study has examined 
the specific processing components of switch costs (i.e., the 
transient costs of task-switching) that are disrupted by anxiety 
(Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Ruthruff et 
al., 2001) or the relation between anxiety and mixing costs—
another crucial index of task-switching, which captures global 
control processing in task-switching. More important, given that 
most empirical studies draw on attentional control theory (Eysenck 
et al., 2007), only a few studies have directly tested three 
theoretical assumptions: (a) the negative effect of anxiety on task-
switching is because of impaired task-set configuration, (b) 
anxious individuals use compensatory strategies to maintain their 
task-switching accuracy, and (c) impaired task-switching 
efficiency is because of distracting threat stimuli, such as 
worrisome thoughts. Given these unresolved empirical and 
theoretical issues, we aimed to examine them using two 
methodological innovations: a novel thought-probe method 
(Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) and 
stochastic diffusion model analysis (Ratcliff, 1978). 
 
Attentional Control Theory 
Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) has 
been widely used to explain why trait and state anxiety impair task-
switching (for a theoretical review of the effect of anxiety on 
cognitive performance, see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). The 
theory postulates that both trait and state anxiety reduce attentional 
focus during task-switching because attentional resources are 
preferentially allocated to either internal threat-related stimuli 
(e.g., worrisome thoughts) or external threat-related stimuli (e.g., 
threatening task-irrelevant distractors). As a result, task-switching 
performance should be compromised because of the reduced 
attentional resources available for actual switching between two 
tasks. The theory makes three important assumptions that merit 
further investigation. 
First, the theory assumes that anxiety likely entails 
compensatory strategies that result in a trade-off between 
effectiveness (accuracy) and efficiency (response time, RT; 
Eysenck et al., 2007).
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2007). Anxiety has been found to affect RT in task-switching, but
not accuracy (Ansari et al., 2008; Derakshan et al., 2009; Edwards
et al., 2015). The theory accounts for this finding by assuming that
anxiety motivates individuals to adopt conservative decision styles
to maintain performance effectiveness at the cost of efficiency, that
is, increased processing time. Performance effectiveness concerns
the quality of performance, which is typically assessed by outcome
measures such as accuracy on the task, whereas processing effi-
ciency concerns the investment in and operation of processing
resources (e.g., time spent on the task), which is typically assessed
by RT. However, although the negative effect of anxiety on RT
(but not on accuracy) can be interpreted in favor of anxious
individuals’ use of compensatory strategies, this interpretation
should be assessed with caution, because accuracy measures are
potentially vulnerable to ceiling effects (Dixon, 2008) and are less
reliable than RT measures in a task-switching paradigm (Hartanto
et al., 2016). Moreover, individual differences in task-switching
performance are typically observed in RTs rather than accuracy.
For instance, the null effect on accuracy has been demonstrated in
a wide range of research areas, including aging (Kramer et al.,
1999; Kray et al., 2002); developmental disorders (Gargaro et al.,
2015); positive emotion (Yang & Yang, 2014); and other experi-
ential factors such as second language usage or video gaming
(Green et al., 2012; Hartanto & Yang, 2019; Yang et al., 2018). In
view of this, the lack of an effect of anxiety on accuracy may
simply reflect an artifact in the measurement, instead of anxious
individuals’ use of compensatory strategies. Despite the empirical
and theoretical importance of this phenomenon, by which trait and
state anxiety impair RT but not accuracy (Ansari et al., 2008;
Goodwin & Sher, 1992), few studies have directly tested the
theoretical assumption that concerns the use of compensatory
strategies under anxiety. Hence, more studies are warranted to
verify anxious individuals’ use of compensatory strategies in task-
switching.
Second, attentional control theory assumes that the negative
effect of trait and state anxiety on switch costs is because of
impaired efficiency in task-set reconfiguration—that is, a con-
trolled process of replacing a task with a new task (Rogers &
Monsell, 1995). Although some previous findings of greater
switch costs in individuals with high levels of either trait (Ansari
et al., 2008) or state anxiety (Derakshan et al., 2009) appear to
partially support this assumption, they are not entirely unequivocal
in two respects. No studies have clearly found that both state and
trait anxiety are associated with switch costs. For example, De-
rakshan et al. (2009) found that only state anxiety, not trait anxiety,
was associated with switch costs. Moreover, given that switch
costs arise not only from task-set reconfiguration, but also from
proactive interference—that is, a general slowdown when switch-
ing to a new task because of interference from a previous task
(Wylie & Allport, 2000)—previous studies have not investigated
how anxiety would affect these different processing components of
switch costs. Therefore, further studies are needed to test the
theoretical assumption that anxiety impairs task-switching effi-
ciency via its negative influence on task-set reconfiguration pro-
cessing or proactive interference.
Lastly, attentional control theory posits that anxiety impairs
task-switching efficiency, since attentional resources are devoted
to either internal threat-related stimuli (e.g., worrisome thoughts)
or external threat-related stimuli (e.g., threatening task-irrelevant
distractors). In the absence of apparently threatening task-
irrelevant distractors (e.g., threatening word distractors), however,
the negative relation between anxiety and task-switching effi-
ciency should be attributed to internal threat-related stimuli such as
worrisome thoughts. However, there is little evidence that supports
the mediating role of worrisome thoughts in the relation between
anxiety and task-switching performance. Specifically, several
studies that examined worrisome thoughts either before or after
completion of the task (Forster et al., 2015; Harris, 2013; Moser et
al., 2012) failed to find any significant relation between worries
and cognitive performance, although the reliability of methods for
quantifying worrisome thoughts, either prospectively or retrospec-
tively, may be questionable (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Moreover,
neuroimaging studies (Bishop, 2009; Forster et al., 2015) suggest
that trait anxiety is associated with substantially reduced atten-
tional control that is not necessarily caused by worrisome thoughts.
For instance, Forster et al. (2015) argue that worrisome thoughts
are generally the product of impoverished attentional control,
which is evident under trait anxiety. In favor of this, the literature
on mind wandering suggests that diminished attentional control
increases mind wandering, but not vice versa (McVay & Kane,
2009, 2010). In view of these findings, examining the theorized
mediating role of worrisome thoughts in the relation between
anxiety and task-switching is an interesting next step.
Research Goals
Our research goals were fivefold. First, we aimed to elucidate
the specific processing component of task-switching that is af-
fected by anxiety. To this end, we used stochastic diffusion model
analysis (Ratcliff, 1978) to decompose switch costs into two pro-
cessing components: task-set reconfiguration and proactive inter-
ferences. Based on the assumption that decisions are based on the
accumulation of information over time until a response boundary
is reached and a motor response elicited (see Figure 1), the
diffusion model derives a number of meaningful parameters by
using information provided by the positions, shapes, and sizes of
empirical RT distributions. The parameters of our primary interest
are drift rate (v), which quantifies the speed and direction of
information accumulation during the decision process, and nonde-
cision time (t0), which quantifies the duration of all nondecision
processes, such as encoding or response execution. Recent studies
that used a diffusion model (Karayanidis et al., 2009; Mansfield et
al., 2011; Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014) have demonstrated that
nondecision time (t0) captures an earlier phase of a task switch,
which reflects task-set reconfiguration processing, while drift rate
(v) captures a later phase of a task switch, which reflects proactive
interference. Therefore, examining nondecision time (t0) and drift
rate (v) of the diffusion model would allow us to examine whether
impaired switch costs under anxiety can be attributed to either
task-set reconfiguration or proactive interference. Drawing on
attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), we hypothesized
that if impaired switch costs under anxiety are because of task-set
reconfiguration processing, both trait and state anxiety would
impair nondecision time (t0) but not drift rate (v).
Second, we aimed to examine whether anxiety is prone to
facilitating the use of compensatory strategies during task-
switching. Given the theoretical assumption that anxious individ-






































































































2 HARTANTO AND YANG
task-switching at the expense of processing efficiency (i.e., slower
processing time; Eysenck et al., 2007), anxious individuals’ use of
compensatory strategies during task-switching can be tested by
another parameter of the diffusion model, boundary separation (a),
which quantifies the speed–accuracy trade-off. A higher value of
boundary separation reflects higher accuracy at the expense of
slower RT (Starns & Ratcliff, 2010), which in turn indicates a
conservative decision style that is consistent with the notion of a
compensatory strategy. Given this, we hypothesized that if anxiety
facilitates performance effectiveness (accuracy) at the cost of
processing efficiency (RT) via the use of compensatory strategies
during task-switching, higher state or trait anxiety should entail
larger boundary separation values. Specifically, we hypothesized
that anxiety would be positively associated with boundary sepa-
ration when calculated in mixed blocks, which demand task-
switching, but not in pure blocks, which do not. This would
suggest that anxious individuals’ conservative tendency is selec-
tive, depending on the rigor of the task—that is, their conservative
tendency reflects their compensatory strategies for maintaining
high accuracy during the task-switching that occurs only in mixed
blocks. Furthermore, if compensatory strategies suppressed the
negative effect of anxiety on performance effectiveness (accu-
racy), we expected that statistically controlling for compensatory
strategies (indexed by boundary separation parameters) would
result in impaired task-switching effectiveness.
Third, we aimed to examine the relation between anxiety and
mixing costs—another critical index of task-switching perfor-
mance in the paradigm. Research on anxiety and task-switching
has mostly focused on switch costs (Ansari et al., 2008; Derakshan
et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2015), which implicate transient
control processes at a local level that trigger switching from one
task set to another (Monsell, 2003). However, task-switching en-
tails not only switch costs, but also mixing costs that arise from
global control mechanisms when monitoring and maintaining two
competing task sets (Braver et al., 2003; Rubin & Meiran, 2005).
Given that different control mechanisms underlie switch and mix-
ing costs, a critical question is whether the adverse effect of
anxiety on switch costs extends to mixing costs that are rooted in
global control mechanisms and essential for facilitating task-
switching by optimizing one’s preparation to switch (Braver et al.,
2003). As predicted by attentional control theory, we hypothesized
that if anxiety impairs processing efficiency (RT) in task-
switching, both state and trait anxiety would result in greater
mixing costs.
Fourth, we aimed to examine the mediating role of task-
unrelated thoughts (TUT) in the relation between anxiety and
task-switching. To assess TUT without resorting to either prospec-
tive or retrospective measurements, we used an online thought
probe technique (Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Unsworth & McMillan,
2014) during task-switching, in which participants were asked at
random points to report whether their immediately preceding
thoughts were on- or off-task. Despite the introspective nature of
this technique, previous studies have demonstrated that an online
thought-probe technique is reasonably valid for assessing TUT and
predicts cognitive performance significantly better than other ob-
jective markers of mind wandering, such as intraindividual RT
patterns (McVay & Kane, 2012). Moreover, to test the theory’s
prediction that anxiety would reduce attentional focus during task-
switching by increasing threatening worrisome thoughts (espe-
cially in the absence of external threatening task-irrelevant distrac-
tors), we modified the thought-probe technique to differentiate
between nonthreatening TUT (e.g., daydreaming) and threatening
Figure 1
Diffusion Processes Underlying the Diffusion Model
Note. The model assumes that decisions are based on information accumulation over time, which is represented by the drift rate
(v) that begins at starting point (z) until a response boundary (0 or a) is reached and a motor response elicited. The entire process
is assumed to be noisy and results in a different fluctuation per trial, even when identical information is available (Ratcliff, 1978;
see Voss et al., 2013, for a practical introduction to diffusion models). From “A Diffusion Model Analysis of Developmental
Changes in Children’s Task Switching,” by W. D. Weeda, M. W. van der Molen, F. Barceló, and M. Huizinga, 2014, Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 126, p. 180. Copyright [2014] by Elsevier Inc. Reprinted with permission. See the online article






































































































3ANXIETY, MIND WANDERING, AND TASK-SWITCHING
TUT (e.g., worries), and hypothesized that the negative effect of
anxiety on task-switching would be mediated by the frequency of
threatening TUT, but not by nonthreatening TUT. However, if the
frequency of threatening TUT does not mediate the effect of
anxiety on task-switching, this would provide evidence in favor of
the alternative view, which is based on recent neuroimaging find-
ings (Forster et al., 2015) and suggests that impoverished prefron-
tal mechanisms under anxiety are not caused by worrisome
thoughts, but rather reflect an inherent characteristic of trait anx-
iety.
Lastly, we aimed to explore the moderating effect of working
memory capacity (WMC), which refers to the ability to maintain
task-relevant information in the face of concurrent interference
(Engle et al., 1999), on the relation between anxiety and task-
switching. Although attentional control theory predicts that anxiety
impairs processing efficiency (RT), some studies have failed to
replicate this, even using similar tasks (e.g., Harris, 2013; Un-
sworth et al., 2009). Furthermore, Seipp’s (1991) meta-analysis
found that the negative correlation between anxiety and task per-
formance was heterogeneous, given that some studies had reported
null effects of anxiety or even a positive association between
anxiety and performance. This inconsistency suggests the presence
of exceptional cases, in which anxiety can be nonthreatening—or
even beneficial—for processing efficiency. Our exploration of
WMC as a potential moderator was motivated by recent studies
that suggest that WMC minimizes the cognitive consequences of
anxiety. For instance, Owens et al. (2014) found that WMC sig-
nificantly moderated the relation between anxiety and mathemat-
ical performance. Specifically, anxiety and mathematical perfor-
mance were positively correlated in participants with high WMC,
but negatively correlated in those with low WMC. Similarly,
Johnson and Gronlund (2009) found that trait anxiety did not affect
high WMC individuals on a dual task, which consisted of a highly
demanding memory task as a primary task and an auditory probe
task as a secondary task. These findings suggest that individual
differences in WMC may protect some from the negative impact of
anxiety. Given this, we hypothesized that WMC would moderate
the relation between anxiety and task-switching. In other words,
anxiety would impair task-switching only in individuals with low
WMC, but it would not impair (or alternatively, benefit) task-
switching in those with high WMC.
Method
Participants
One hundred and 60 undergraduates (female  119) from a
local university participated in exchange for extra course credit.
The sample size was determined a priori using GPower (Faul et
al., 2007) to ensure at least 95% power to detect a medium effect
(  .3; e.g., Ansari et al., 2008; Derakshan et al., 2009). Three
participants were excluded because of technical errors during the
study, and five participants who felt unwell or failed to follow
instructions were also excluded. This resulted in a final sample of
152 participants (female  113), with an average age of 20.9 years
(SD  1.74, range  18–26). Participants were from varying
socioeconomic status (SES) levels, as indexed by their monthly
household income in Singapore dollars: less than S$2,500 (8.6%);
S$2,500–S$4,999 (17.8%); S$5,000–S$7,499 (20.4%); S$7,500–
S$9,999 (15.8%); S$10,000–S$12,499 (12.5%); S$12,500–
S$14,999 (7.9%); S$15,000–S$17,499 (7.2%); S$17,500–S$19,999
(3.3%); or more than S$20,000 (6.6%). The study was approved by
the Singapore Management University’s Institutional Review
Board, and informed consent was obtained from all participants
before the study.
Materials
Task-Switching Paradigm With Thought Probing
A task-switching paradigm (Rubin & Meiran, 2005) was used to
examine switch and mixing costs. Participants were asked to
respond as fast and accurately as possible to either the color (red
or green) or shape (circle or triangle) of a bivalent stimulus (i.e.,
red triangle and green circle), according to the cue presented.
Participants responded by pressing either the left key, marked
“red” and “circle,” or the right key, marked “green” and “triangle,”
with the two keys counterbalanced across the participants.
Participants were instructed to complete one practice block
comprising 30 trials and eight experimental blocks, in the follow-
ing order: (a) two pure color and shape blocks, the order of which
was counterbalanced across participants; (b) four mixed blocks; (c)
two pure blocks. All blocks were presented in this fixed order.
Pure blocks consisted of only one task cue and did not involve
task-switching. Mixed blocks consisted of two task cues that
required either task-repeating (repeat trials) or task-switching
(switch trials) at unpredictable times. On repeat trials, the same
task from a preceding trial was presented on a subsequent trial,
whereas on switch trials, switching occurred from one task (e.g.,
color) to another (e.g., shape). Switch costs were calculated in
mixed blocks by subtracting either mean RTs or accuracy on
repeat trials from those on switch trials. Mixing costs were calcu-
lated by subtracting either mean RTs or accuracy on trials in pure
blocks from those on repeat trials in mixed blocks (Rubin &
Meiran, 2005).
Each pure block consisted of 40 trials and each mixed block
of 80 trials. In the mixed blocks, half of the trials involved
task-switching (switch trials) and the other half involved repeat
trials; trials in the mixed blocks were randomly presented, with
a maximum of four consecutive trials of the same task. To-
gether, there were a total of 480 trials, with 160 trials per each
trial type (i.e., pure, repeat, and switch trials). To increase the robust-
ness of the diffusion model analysis and use the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov statistic (Voss & Voss, 2007) as the optimization
criterion, we determined the number of trials based on Voss et
al.’s (2013) recommendation of more than 100 trials for each
participant. A color gradient and a row of small black shapes
were used as cues to indicate color and shape tasks, respec-
tively. There were two possible targets (i.e., a red triangle or a
green circle). For each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 350
ms and was followed by a blank screen for 150 ms. Subse-
quently, the cue appeared for 250 ms and was followed by the
target.
To enhance the task’s demand on proactive interference and
task-set reconfiguration, we modified Rubin and Meiran’s
(2005) color-shape task in two notable respects. First, we ad-
opted overlapping response mapping, in which two response






































































































4 HARTANTO AND YANG
stimuli (a green circle and red triangle), with each response key
mapped to two attributes, that is, a left response key for red and
circle and a right key for green and triangle; note that the target
stimulus did not match a response key on both color and shape.
For instance, for the target stimulus of a green circle, partici-
pants should press a left response key if the cue is shape
(“circle”) and a right key if the cue is color (“green”). This
setup differed from Rubin and Meiran’s (2005) switching task
with nonoverlapping response mapping, which allowed four
response keys, with each response key mapped to only one
attribute out of the four possible. Previous studies have found
that overlapping response mapping increases task demand on
the proactive interference and task-set reconfiguration that un-
derlie switch costs (Gade & Koch, 2007; Meiran, 2000, 2008).
The second modification was the use of stimulus-response
incompatibility. That is, the target stimulus did not match a
response key on both color and shape; thus, a correct answer for
the shape task is always wrong for the color task, and vice
versa. Consequently, this modification required task-inertia and
response recoding, which would impose greater demand on
task-set reconfiguration and proactive interference; thereby,
rendering the task more sensitive for detecting individual dif-
ferences in switch and mixing costs (e.g., Hartanto et al., 2016;
Hartanto & Yang, 2016b).
During the task, participants were also periodically probed and
prompted to press one of seven keys to indicate what they were
thinking immediately before the presentation of the probe
(Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). Thought-
probing questions were as follows: (a) I am totally focused on the
current task; (b) I am thinking about my performance on the task
or how long it is taking; (c) I am thinking about some of my
concerns, troubles, or fears; (d) I am thinking some important stuff
or recent worries; (e) I am distracted by information present in the
room (sights or sounds); (f) I am having some fantasies that are
disconnected from reality; and (g) I am thinking some unimportant
stuff. Of these seven choices, the first was coded as an on-task
thought and the second as task-related interference (TRI). We
distinguished on-task thoughts from TRI, because the latter was
regarded as a form of lapsed attention and indicated that the
participant was not fully focused on the task (Smallwood et al.,
2004). We coded the third and fourth choices as threatening TUT,
the fifth as external distraction, and the sixth and seventh as
nonthreatening TUT.
Several steps were taken to minimize the likelihood that our
thought-probe technique might influence the validity of our switch
costs. First, to minimize the possibility of thought-probe questions’
interfering with task-switching performance, we embedded them
only after the participant had submitted their response on each
trial. Thus, the occurrence of the thought probe should not directly
disrupt participants’ task-switching performance. Second, thought-
probe questions randomly appeared in 15% of the trials and
equally frequently for both repeat and switch trials across all
blocks. Accordingly, thought-probe questions were infrequent and,
thus, less likely to exert systematic influence on the main task.
Lastly, in our final analysis, we excluded trials with thought-probe
questions. Thus, any potential noise driven by thought-probe ques-
tions was eliminated. Taken together, in view of the proven va-
lidity and prevalent use of the technique (Stawarczyk et al., 2011;
Unsworth & McMillan, 2014), it is less likely that inclusion of the
thought probe significantly influenced task-switching perfor-
mance, at least in our study.
Complex Span Tasks
To obtain converging evidence, we used the rotation-span and
symmetry-span tasks to measure WMC (Foster et al., 2015). We
chose these tasks because they have been found to predict signif-
icantly more variance in working memory and fluid intelligence
than other complex span tasks, such as the operation span. In the
rotation-span task, participants were presented with a series of
either short or long arrows pointing in one of eight directions and
asked to remember both the arrow’s length and direction. After (or
before) each of the arrows, participants were given a distractor in
which they decided whether a rotated letter mirrored the target
letter. Set size, which refers to the total number of arrows (length
and direction) participants were asked to recall, varied from two to
five per trial. Similarly, in the symmetry-span task, participants
were instructed to judge whether a displayed shape was symmet-
rical along its vertical axis—that served to distract participants
from processing a subsequent task—and then directed to remem-
ber the location of a red square that randomly appeared in a 4 
4 grid. Set size—that is, the total number of locations of the red
square—varied from two to five per trial. Each working memory
task had two blocks, because it has been shown that the variance
explained by a working memory task tends to plateau after two
blocks. Scores in each task were computed using the partial-credit
unit (PCU) method, in which the participant’s score was expressed
as the proportion of the total number of correct recall responses in
a set (Conway et al., 2005). PCU scores from the rotation-span and
symmetry-span tasks were summed to compute each participant’s
WMC (refer to Table A1 of Appendix for zero-order correlations
among the cognitive variables).
State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)
State and trait versions of the STAI (Spielberg et al., 1983) were
used to assess participants’ state and trait anxiety. The scale
contained 20 items to measure state anxiety (  .90) and another
20 to measure trait anxiety (  .90) on a 4-point Likert scale.
Participants’ responses were scored and summed to compute their
state and trait anxiety.
Procedure
Participants were seated individually in an open cubicle and
asked to sign an informed consent form. Subsequently, they were
asked to complete the state version of the STAI before proceeding
to the switching task with thought probing. Upon completion,
participants were instructed to complete the rotation- and
symmetry-span tasks. Finally, participants completed a demo-
graphic survey and the trait version of the STAI. The entire task
took approximately 70 min to complete.
Results
Switch Costs in Accuracy, Binning Scores, and RT
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were con-






































































































5ANXIETY, MIND WANDERING, AND TASK-SWITCHING
effectiveness (accuracy and binning scores) and efficiency (RT) of
switch costs in task-switching. For the analysis of RT, accurate
responses that were either 2.5 SD above or below an individual’s
mean RT were excluded separately for pure and mixed blocks (see
Table 1 for descriptive statistics). The effectiveness of switch costs
was operationalized by using both accuracy (the percentage of
accurate responses) and binning scores generated by a rank-
ordered binning procedure that combined speed and accuracy data
to form a single, comprehensive index of task-switching perfor-
mance (see Draheim et al., 2016, for more details on calculating
switch costs based on the binning procedure; Hughes et al., 2014).
Following the recommendation of Draheim et al. (2016), we
calculated binning scores in several steps. First, we calculated the
mean RT of correct repeat trials for each participant, then sub-
tracted each participant’s mean RT of correct repeat trials from the
RT of each correct switch trial. The resulting RT differences were
assigned to every accurate switch trial; we referred to these RT
differences as trial-based switch costs. After this, each partici-
pant’s trial-based switch costs were rank ordered into deciles and
a bin value ranging from 1 to 10 was assigned to them. Greater bin
values were assigned to trials with relatively larger switch costs
(lower switching efficiency), whereas smaller bin values were
assigned to trials with relatively smaller switch costs (higher
switch efficiency). More important, to impose a stronger penalty
for errors, the highest bin value of 20 was assigned to each
inaccurate response (Hughes et al., 2014). That is, participants
with more inaccurate responses ended up with higher bin values.
Lastly, we averaged all of the bin values each participant received
to create a single switch cost in binning scores, which ranged from
1 to 20. Together, by doubling the bin value (i.e., 20) for incorrect
trials, compared with the bin value of 10 assigned to correct trials
with the slowest RTs, binning scores can serve as a good proxy for
performance effectiveness (accuracy) and demonstrate higher re-
liability than typical switch costs in accuracy (Draheim et al.,
2016; Hughes et al., 2014).
We found that state anxiety did not significantly predict switch
costs in RT (B  1.94, SE  1.04, 95% confidence interval, CI
[0.12, 4.00],   .15, t  1.87, p  .064); switch costs in
accuracy (B  0.00, SE  0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00],   .06,
t  0.75, p  .453); or switch costs in binning scores (B  0.02,
SE  0.01, 95% CI [.005, .046],   .13, t  1.59, p  .114).
Similarly, trait anxiety also did not significantly predict switch
costs in RT (B  1.66, SE  1.00, 95% CI [0.30, 3.63],   .14,
t  1.67, p  .097); switch costs in accuracy (B  0.00, SE 
0.00, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00],   .04, t  0.51, p  .608); or
switch costs in binning scores (B  0.01, SE  0.01, 95% CI
[.018, .032],   .05, t  0.57, p  .571).
Diffusion Model Analysis of Switch Costs
We performed diffusion model analysis to decompose switch
costs into task-set reconfiguration and proactive interference. In
our computation, drift rate (v), nondecision time (t0), and boundary
separation (a) were allowed to vary freely across pure, repeat, and
switch trials. Following the recommendation of Voss et al. (2013),
the starting point (zr) was fixed at the midpoint between the two
response boundaries (i.e., 0 or a; zr  0.5; see Figure 1). Similarly,
the intertrial variability of diffusion model parameters and
response-execution differences (d) were fixed to zero, except for
the intertrial variability of nondecisional components (st0), which
were held constant across trials (Hartanto & Yang, 2016a; Voss et
al., 2013). Parameters were estimated using fast-dm for each
participant, using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test statistic for
optimization of parameters (Voss et al., 2015). To examine model
fit, we computed predicted (parameter-based) and empirical cu-
mulative distribution functions (cdfs) for both switch and repeat
trials for each participant based on the recommendation of Schmitz
and Voss (2012) and Voss et al. (2013). As shown in Figure 2, we
found good model fit, because most of the predicted cdfs fell on
the empirical cdf line, supporting the validity of our diffusion
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Anxiety, Task-Switching, and Working Memory Measures
Variable M SD Range Skewness Kurtosis
Anxiety (STAI)
State 40.04 8.77 23.00–69.00 0.64 0.85
Trait 46.70 9.19 27.00–71.00 0.14 0.59
Boundary separation (a)
Pure trials 1.26 0.31 0.50–2.38 0.65 0.72
Repeat trials 1.90 0.44 0.80–2.87 0.12 0.41
Switch trials 1.80 0.44 0.83–2.94 0.47 0.22
Switch costs
Accuracy (%) 0.08 0.05 0.25–0.03 0.94 0.72
RT (ms) 234 113 22–620 0.73 0.90
Binning score 7.12 1.41 3.95–11.53 0.68 0.61
Drift rate (v) 0.60 0.53 2.94–0.90 1.35 4.08
Nondecision time (t0; ms) 148 105 78–520 0.80 1.03
Mixing costs
Accuracy (%) 0.01 0.04 0.19–0.22 0.08 11.31
RT (ms) 311 162 3–935 0.93 1.20
Working memory
Rotation-spana 5.72 1.39 0.53–8.25 1.00 1.36
Symmetry-spana 6.21 1.27 1.73–8.00 1.30 2.16
Total scoreb 11.94 2.22 3.73–15.45 1.24 1.93
Note. STAI  State–Trait Anxiety Inventory; RT  response time.






































































































6 HARTANTO AND YANG
model analyses. We calculated switch costs in terms of drift
rate—that captures proactive interference processes—by subtract-
ing drift values on repeat trials from those on switch trials. Like-
wise, switch costs in terms of nondecison time—that captures
task-set reconfiguration processes—were calculated by subtracting
nondecision time on repeat trials from that on switch trials.
Similar to the analyses performed above for accuracy, binning
scores, and RT data, a new set of regression analyses was con-
ducted to elucidate the specific component of task-switching that is
affected by state and trait anxiety. As shown in Figure 3, we found
that state anxiety significantly predicted switch costs when calcu-
lated in terms of nondecision time (B  2.18, SE  0.96, 95% CI
[0.29, 4.08],   .18, t  2.27, p  .024), but failed to predict
switch costs in terms of drift rate (B  0.01, SE  0.01, 95% CI
[0.00, 0.02],   .16, t  1.96, p  .052). In contrast, trait
anxiety failed to predict switch costs in terms of both nondecision
time (B  1.52, SE  0.92, 95% CI [0.31, 3.34],   .13, t 
1.64, p  .102) and drift rate (B  0.01, SE  0.01, 95% CI
[0.02, 0.17],   .13, t  1.56, p  .122). These findings
suggest that the negative relation between state anxiety and switch
costs can be attributed to impaired task-set reconfiguration during
task-switching.
Mixing Costs
We conducted regression analyses to investigate whether state
and trait anxiety predict mixing costs in terms of effectiveness
(accuracy) or efficiency (RT). Similar to the analyses performed
above for switch costs, accurate responses that were either 2.5 SD
above or below an individual’s mean RT were excluded separately
for pure and mixed blocks. As shown in Figure 4, we found that
state anxiety was a significant predictor of mixing costs in RT
(B  3.76, SE  1.48, 95% CI [0.84, 6.68],   .20, t  2.55, p 
.012), but not in accuracy (B  0.00, SE  0.00, 95% CI [0.001,
0.001],   .03, t  0.38, p  .701). However, we found that
trait anxiety did not significantly predict mixing costs in either RT
(B  1.86, SE  1.43, 95% CI [0.97, 4.69],   .11, t  1.30,
p  .196) or accuracy (B  0.00, SE  0.00, 95% CI [0.001,
0.00],   .04, t  0.54, p  .592). These results suggest that
only state anxiety was associated with impaired efficiency of
mixing costs (in RT).
Compensatory Strategies
To examine anxious individuals’ proneness to adopt compensa-
tory strategies during task-switching, we performed regression
analyses to examine whether state and trait anxiety predicts bound-
ary separation (a) of the diffusion model. We found that state
anxiety emerged as a significant predictor of boundary separation
for repeat trials (B  0.011, SE  0.004, 95% CI [0.003, 0.019],
  .22, t  2.81, p  .006) and switch trials (B  0.009, SE 
0.004, 95% CI [0.001, 0.017],   .18, t  2.19, p  .030), but not
for pure trials (B  0.004, SE  0.003, 95% CI [0.002, 0.009],
  .10, t  1.28, p  .202). Similarly, trait anxiety significantly
Figure 2
Predicted (Parameter-Based) and Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions
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Note. Following the suggestion of Schmitz and Voss (2012), predicted and empirical cdfs were
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7ANXIETY, MIND WANDERING, AND TASK-SWITCHING
predicted boundary separation for repeat trials (B  0.008, SE 
0.004, 95% CI [0.000, 0.015],   .16, t  2.00, p  .047) and
switch trials (B  0.008, SE  0.004, 95% CI [0.000, 0.015],  
.16, t  1.98, p  .049), but not for pure trials (B  0.003, SE 
0.003, 95% CI [0.003, 0.008],   .07, t  0.91, p  .367).
However, the relation between state anxiety and boundary sepa-
ration for trials in pure blocks was not significantly different from
the two relations state anxiety had with boundary separation for
repeat trials (z  1.60, p  .059) and switch trials (z  0.85, p 
.197) in mixed blocks. Similarly, the relation between trait anxiety
and boundary separation for pure trials was not significantly dif-
ferent from the relation trait anxiety had with boundary separation
for repeat (z  1.12, p  .131) and switch trials (z  1.02, p 
.155). These findings suggest that individuals with greater state or
trait anxiety behave conservatively in general and not selectively
depending on task demands. They do this by using strategies (e.g.,
heightened cautiousness or intolerance of uncertainty) that en-
hance their performance effectiveness (accuracy) by sacrificing
processing efficiency (see Figure 5).
Furthermore, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses to
examine whether the use of a compensatory strategy could have
suppressed potentially negative impacts of anxiety on task-
switching effectiveness (accuracy), as predicted by attentional
control theory. That is, we examined whether our null finding of
anxiety on switch costs in accuracy could have occurred because
of the use of compensatory strategies. To investigate this theoret-
ical assumption, we tested our hierarchical regression model by
entering anxiety in Step 1 of the model to predict task-switching
effectiveness (i.e., switch costs in terms of accuracy or binning
scores). In Step 2, we included boundary separation parameters—
that were calculated for both repeat and switch trials—to estimate
the unique effect of anxiety on performance effectiveness without
the influence of compensatory strategies. We tested a separate
model for state and trait anxiety.
As shown in Table 2, state anxiety did not significantly predict
switch costs in accuracy (p  .453) or those calculated by the
binning procedure (p  .114). However, when boundary separa-
tions for repeat and switch trials—that indicate compensatory
strategies—were controlled for in Step 2 of the model, state
anxiety significantly predicted switch costs calculated by the bin-
ning procedure (p  .002) but not accuracy (p  .063). Taken
together, we found only partial evidence that the use of compen-
satory strategies suppresses the negative influence of state anxiety
on performance effectiveness in task-switching. However, there
was no clear evidence that compensatory strategies suppress the
potentially negative influence of trait anxiety on performance
effectiveness.
Task-Unrelated Thoughts (TUT)
We conducted mediation analyses to examine whether threat-
ening or nonthreatening TUT would mediate the relation between
Figure 3
Scatterplots and Regression Lines Indicating the Relation Between Anxiety and







































































































































































































8 HARTANTO AND YANG
anxiety and task-switching. We focused only on state anxiety as
our independent variable, because trait anxiety failed to predict
most of our criterion variables. We considered three potential
mediators: (a) threatening TUT, (b) nonthreatening TUT, and (c)
total TUT (threatening TUT 	 nonthreatening TUT; see Table 3
for the proportion of each thought type during the task). We
included criterion variables that were found to be significantly
associated with state anxiety: switch costs calculated in nondeci-
sion time (t0), mixing costs in RT, and boundary separations (a)
for repeat trials and switch trials. Multiple mediation models were
estimated using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2009), with bias-
corrected bootstrapping of 10,000 samples for all analyses. Medi-
ation was considered significant if 95% bias-corrected confidence
intervals for indirect effects did not encompass zero (Preacher &
Hayes, 2004).
As presented in Table 4, state anxiety was positively associated
with threatening TUT and total TUT. However, threatening TUT
and total TUT did not significantly predict any of our criterion
variables (e.g., switch costs in nondecision time and mixing costs
in RT). As a result, no indirect effects were significant across the
12 mediation models. This suggests that TUT does not mediate the
negative effect of state anxiety on task-switching performance.
Working Memory Capacity (WMC)
We performed a series of moderation analyses using the PROCESS
macro (Model 1; Hayes, 2009) to examine whether WMC would
moderate the effect of state or trait anxiety on task-switching
performance. Because of a technical issue, data from one partici-
pant’s rotation-span and symmetry-span tasks were excluded from
the analyses. As shown in Table 5, interaction terms between
anxiety and WMC did not significantly predict any indexes of
task-switching performance. We also conducted Bayesian regres-
sion using JASP (JASP Team, 2018) to find evidence for a null
effect. Based on the recommendation of Wagenmakers et al.
(2018), in all of our Bayesian moderation analyses, we estimated
the Bayes factor in favor of the model with two main effects over
the one with an additional interaction (i.e., the interaction model).
As shown in Table 6, our Bayesian analysis indicated anecdotal to
moderate evidence in favor of the null effect of the moderating role
of WMC on the relation between anxiety and our focal variables in
task-switching. Taken together, these results indicate that WMC
does not moderate the link between anxiety and task-switching.
Exploratory Analyses of the Interaction Between State
and Trait Anxiety
We explored the interaction effects of state and trait anxiety on
all of our outcome variables. As shown in Table 7, we found
significant interaction effects of state and trait anxiety on switch
costs in accuracy and drift rate, mixing costs in RT, boundary
separation for pure trials, repeat trials, and switch trials. We
conducted simple slope analyses to probe these interaction effects
further. As shown in Figure 6, we found that state anxiety signif-
Figure 4
Scatterplots and Regression Lines Indicating the Relation Between Anxiety and
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9ANXIETY, MIND WANDERING, AND TASK-SWITCHING
icantly predicted switch costs in drift rate, mixing costs in RT, and
boundary separation for pure trials, repeat trials, and switch trial—
except for switch costs in accuracy—in participants with lower
trait anxiety, but not higher trait anxiety. Nevertheless, caution is
necessary in interpreting these results because of the exploratory
nature of moderation analyses and a high correlation between state
and trait anxiety, r  .545, p  .001, which consequently partials
out much of their construct-relevant variance in the moderation
analyses.
Discussion
Our main findings contribute in many ways to clarifying both
the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of the relation between
anxiety and task-switching (switch and mixing costs). Below, we
discuss the study’s notable findings and their theoretical implica-
tions in more detail.
First, given that switch costs implicate (a) task-set reconfigura-
tion in alternating between two task sets and (b) proactive inter-
ference from the previous task set, our study elucidates the specific
processing component of switch costs that is influenced by anxi-
ety. Drawing on two diffusion-model parameters of nondecision
time (t0) and drift rate (v) that primarily reflect task-set reconfigu-
ration and proactive interference processes, respectively (Schmitz
& Voss, 2012, 2014), we found that state anxiety was associated
with higher values of nondecision time for switch costs, but not
with drift rate. These results suggest that state anxiety influences
Figure 5
Scatterplots and Regression Lines Illustrating the Relation Between Anxiety and
Boundary Separation (a) of the Diffusion Model—That Captures the Use of
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10 HARTANTO AND YANG
switch costs via task-set reconfiguration and not via proactive
interference. Our findings support the prediction of the attentional
control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) that the adverse effect of
anxiety on switch costs is caused by impaired efficiency during the
task-set reconfiguration process, which requires top-down atten-
tional control. Given that task-set reconfiguration is considered to
be an essential aspect of the control mechanism of executive
functions (Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), which are the
higher-order cognitive processes that regulate goal-directed ac-
tions (Miyake et al., 2000), our findings are consistent with pre-
vious studies that report negative effects of anxiety on the pro-
cessing efficiency of other core executive functions, such as
inhibitory control (e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2010).
On the other hand, however, our finding of the absence of a
relation between trait anxiety and switch costs contradicts previous
findings of significant associations between trait anxiety and
switch costs (Derakshan et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2015). This
inconsistency may be because of trait anxiety’s more subtle im-
pairment of task-switching than state anxiety, as the former is
assumed to be a predisposition to experience state anxiety (Ey-
senck et al., 2007; see Booth & Peker, 2017, for similar findings).
This explanation is in line with the notion that state anxiety is more
crucial than trait anxiety in determining individual differences in
processing efficiency and performance effectiveness (Eysenck &
Calvo, 1992, p. 414). Alternatively, our discrepant results could be
simply because of measurement-related (e.g., STAI) or task-
specific issues.
Moreover, our finding that impaired processing efficiency in
switch and mixing costs is more directly related to state anxiety
than trait anxiety is not consistent with behavioral (Pacheco-
Unguetti et al., 2010) and neuroimaging (Bishop et al., 2009;
Forster et al., 2015) studies, which suggest that high trait anxiety
is associated with impoverished attentional control on behavioral
tasks and the prefrontal mechanism underlying attentional func-
tioning, respectively. Those studies claim that anxiety-related def-
icits in prefrontal functioning might reflect an underlying charac-
teristic of trait anxiety, and do not necessarily arise from state
anxiety or worrisome thoughts (i.e., TUT). Given this discrepancy,
more research is warranted to examine the causal relation between
state and trait anxiety, TUT, and impaired recruitment of prefrontal
mechanisms.
The second notable finding is that our study extends the under-
standing of the cognitive effects of anxiety on the mixing costs of
task-switching. The majority of previous studies have focused on
switch costs (Derakshan et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2015), and
little is known about the impact of anxiety on mixing costs. Yet,
the latter implicates global sustained control mechanisms in mon-
itoring and maintaining two competing task sets and resolving the
interference or conflicts that arise from them (Rubin & Meiran,
2005). Although processing efficiency in maintaining two com-
Table 2
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses for Predicting Switch Costs Calculated in Accuracy and by the
Binning Procedure
Step 1 Step 2
Variable B (SE)  p B (SE)  p
Model 1: DV  Switch costs (accuracy)
State anxiety 0.000 (.000) .061 .453 0.001 (.000) .145 .063
Boundary separation (repeat trials) — — — 0.025 (.014) .204 .061
Boundary separation (switch trials) — — — 0.025 (.014) .219 .083
Model 2: DV  Switch costs (binning score)
State anxiety 0.021 (.013) .129 .114 0.037 (.012) .229 .002
Boundary separation (repeat trials) — — — 1.677 (.362) .523 .000
Boundary separation (switch trials) — — — 0.301 (.356) .094 .399
Model 3: DV  Switch costs (accuracy)
Trait anxiety 0.000 (.000) .042 .514 0.000 (.000) .021 .786
Boundary separation (repeat trials) — — — 0.021 (.014) .175 .138
Boundary separation (switch trials) — — — 0.026 (.014) .218 .065
Model 4: DV  Switch costs (binning score)
Trait anxiety 0.007 (.012) .046 .571 0.017 (.012) .110 .148
Boundary separation (repeat trials) — — — 1.555 (.367) .484 .000
Boundary separation (switch trials) — — — 0.282 (.365) .088 .441
Note. DV  dependent variable. Higher B values reflect better performance in switch costs in accuracy, while lower B values reflect better performance
(i.e., smaller bin values) in switch costs calculated by the binning procedure.
Table 3
Proportions of Each Thought Type During Task-Switching in Pure and Mixed Blocks
Type of block On-task TRI Threatening TUT Nonthreatening TUT ED
Total 0.55 (0.31) 0.28 (0.25) 0.08 (0.17) 0.07 (0.12) 0.03 (0.06)
Pure blocks 0.62 (0.33) 0.23 (0.26) 0.07 (0.18) 0.06 (0.11) 0.03 (0.06)
Mixed blocks 0.51 (0.34) 0.30 (0.28) 0.08 (0.18) 0.07 (0.14) 0.04 (0.07)






































































































11ANXIETY, MIND WANDERING, AND TASK-SWITCHING
peting task sets has been deemed essential for successful task-
switching, because it optimizes one’s preparation to switch (Braver
et al., 2003), our study is the first to investigate the potential
impact of anxiety on mixing costs. Hence, our finding of positive
associations between state anxiety and mixing costs in RT (but not
in accuracy) extends the literature by demonstrating that anxiety
impairs not only switch costs but also mixing costs.
Third, we only found partial evidence for the use of compensa-
tory strategies by anxious individuals. Attentional control theory
predicts that anxious individuals are motivated to protect their
performance effectiveness (accuracy) from the adverse effects of
anxiety by sacrificing processing efficiency (RT) in task-
switching. We examined this theoretical prediction by computing
boundary separation parameters of the diffusion model, which
quantify conservative decision styles. We found that both state and
trait anxiety were positively associated only with boundary sepa-
rations of mixed blocks and not those of pure blocks. However, the
relation between anxiety and boundary separation in mixed blocks
was not significantly different from that between anxiety and
boundary separation in pure blocks. Moreover, we found only one
significantly suppressing role of the compensatory strategy—out
of four analyses—in the relation between state anxiety and switch
costs in binning scores. These findings suggest that there is no
strong evidence that anxious individuals selectively enhance per-
formance effectiveness by sacrificing processing efficiency, espe-
cially when tasks are demanding and require extra attentional
control in switching from one task to another (as in mixed blocks).
In fact, it is plausible that the positive correlation between anxiety
and boundary separation is because of an overall heightened level
of cautiousness or higher intolerance of anxiety, instead of engage-
ment in compensatory strategies. Nevertheless, the finding should
be carefully interpreted because many factors, such as task instruc-
Table 4

















Threatening TUT Switch costs (t0) 0.007 (0.002) 56.04 (51.68) 2.18 (0.96) 2.57 (1.02) 0.39 (0.36) [1.347, 0.085] 0.03
Mixing costs (RT) 0.007 (0.002) 69.92 (79.61) 3.76 (1.48) 3.28 (1.58) 0.48 (0.69) [0.940, 1.888] 0.03
BS for repeat trials 0.007 (0.002) 0.08 (0.22) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) [0.004, 0.003] 0.01
BS for switch trials 0.007 (0.002) 0.02 (0.22) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) [0.005, 0.003] 0.03
Nonthreatening-TUT Switch costs (t0) 0.002 (0.001) 99.99 (71.63) 2.18 (0.96) 2.02 (0.96) 0.16 (0.22) [0.107, 0.826] 0.01
Mixing costs (RT) 0.002 (0.001) 103.06 (110.56) 3.76 (1.48) 3.60 (1.49) 0.16 (0.26) [0.120, 0.893] 0.01
BS for repeat trials 0.002 (0.001) 0.45 (0.30) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) [0.000, 0.003] 0.01
BS for switch trials 0.002 (0.001) 0.35 (0.30) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) [0.000, 0.003] 0.01
Total TUT Switch costs (t0) 0.009 (0.002) 3.06 (44.09) 2.18 (0.96) 2.21 (1.03) 0.03 (0.45) [1.016, 0.783] 0.00
Mixing costs (RT) 0.009 (0.002) 89.04 (67.42) 3.76 (1.48) 3.00 (1.58) 0.76 (0.61) [0.399, 2.026] 0.04
BS for repeat trials 0.009 (0.002) 0.22 (0.18) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) [0.001, 0.005] 0.04
BS for switch trials 0.009 (0.002) 0.11 (0.19) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) [0.003, 0.005] 0.02
Note. CI  confidence interval. SEs are shown in parentheses. State anxiety was used as an independent variable in all analyses. Analyses were conducted
with bias-corrected bootstrapping with 10,000 samples. TUT  task-unrelated thought; switch costs (t0)  nondecision times of switch costs in response
time (RT); mixing costs (RT)  mixing costs in RT; BS  boundary separations.
 p  .05.  p  .001.
Table 5
Summary of Interactions Between Anxiety and WMC on Task-Switching Using Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Interaction DV B SE 95% CI p
State Anxiety  WMC Switch costs (RT) 0.069 0.541 [1.138, 1.000] .899
Switch costs (accuracy) 0.000 0.000 [0.001, 0.001] .903
Switch costs (drift rate) 0.002 0.003 [0.003, 0.007] .441
Switch costs (nondecision time) 0.100 0.491 [0.871, 1.071] .839
Mixing costs (RT) 0.633 0.777 [0.902, 2.168] .416
Mixing costs (accuracy) 0.000 0.000 [0.001, 0.000] .069
Boundary separation for pure trials 0.000 0.002 [0.002, 0.003] .852
Boundary separation for repeat trials 0.001 0.002 [0.005, 0.003] .554
Boundary separation for switch trials 0.000 0.002 [0.005, 0.004] .873
Trait Anxiety  WMC Switch costs (RT) 0.463 0.494 [0.513, 1.440] .350
Switch costs (accuracy) 0.000 0.000 [0.001, 0.000] .278
Switch costs (drift rate) 0.000 0.002 [0.004, 0.005] .897
Switch costs (nondecision time) 0.200 0.453 [1.095, 0.696] .660
Mixing costs (RT) 0.965 0.717 [0.453, 2.382] .181
Mixing costs (accuracy) 0.000 0.000 [0.001, 0.000] .287
Boundary separation for pure trials 0.001 0.001 [0.004, 0.002] .590
Boundary separation for repeat trials 0.002 0.002 [0.002, 0.006] .264
Boundary separation for switch trials 0.002 0.002 [0.001, 0.006] .215






































































































12 HARTANTO AND YANG
tion and individual differences in response style, can influence and
obscure the relation between anxiety and boundary separation.
Fourth, it is noteworthy that although anxious individuals likely
experience threatening TUT, we found that threatening or non-
threatening TUT do not mediate the relation between anxiety and
task-switching performance. This finding is consistent with recent
studies that have failed to find any relation between worry and
cognitive performance, such as attention or executive functions
(Forster et al., 2015; Harris, 2013; Moser et al., 2012). Moreover,
given that attentional control theory de-emphasizes the mediating
role of worrisome thoughts in the relation between anxiety and
performance efficiency (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck &
Derakshan, 2011), our finding lends support for Derakshan and
Eysenck’s (2009) view that the relation between anxiety and
task-switching efficiency may not be directly mediated by worri-
some thought.
Despite the absence of a mediating effect of TUT on task-
switching, however, it is notable that the frequency of TUT was
associated with slower RT on all trial types in task-switching—that
is, pure, r  .221, p  .006; repeat, r  .221, p  .006; and switch
trials, r  .189, p  .020—that suggests that TUT may indiscrim-
inately impair processing efficiency (RT) despite the different task
demands associated with each type of trials in the task-switching
paradigm. This may be because of lapsed attention caused by mind
wandering (McVay & Kane, 2009). Given that the adverse effect
of TUT on processing efficiency was not trial-specific, its effect on
task-switching could have been cancelled out when switch costs
were calculated between switch and repeat trials, both of which
were similarly slowed by TUT.
Alternatively, switch and mixing costs might be more vulnera-
ble to the intensity of worrisome thoughts than to their frequency.
According to attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007),
Table 6
Summary of Interaction Effects of Anxiety and WMC on Task-Switching Using
Bayesian Analyses
Interaction DV BF10 BF01 Evidence category for H0
State Anxiety  WMC Switch costs (RT) 0.310 3.226 Moderate
Switch costs (accuracy) 0.318 3.147 Moderate
Switch costs (nondecision time) 0.303 3.304 Moderate
Switch costs (drift rate) 0.381 2.625 Anecdotal
Mixing costs (RT) 0.375 2.669 Moderate
Mixing costs (accuracy) 0.741 1.350 Anecdotal
Boundary separation for pure trials 0.311 3.212 Moderate
Boundary separation for repeat trials 0.332 3.012 Moderate
Boundary separation for switch trials 0.295 3.384 Moderate
Trait Anxiety  WMC Switch costs (RT) 0.462 2.163 Anecdotal
Switch costs (accuracy) 0.533 1.877 Anecdotal
Switch costs (nondecision time) 0.340 2.937 Anecdotal
Switch costs (drift rate) 0.302 3.313 Moderate
Mixing costs (RT) 0.662 1.510 Anecdotal
Mixing costs (accuracy) 0.518 1.929 Anecdotal
Boundary separation for pure trials 0.353 2.833 Anecdotal
Boundary separation for repeat trials 0.524 1.910 Anecdotal
Boundary separation for switch trials 0.590 1.694 Anecdotal
Note. WMC  working memory capacity; RT  response time; DV  dependent variable. The Bayes factor
was computed based on comparison of the model with two main effects and the model with additional interaction
terms (i.e., the interaction model), using a noninformative JZS default prior. The classification scheme for
interpretation of the Bayes factors is based on Lee and Wagenmakers (2013).
Table 7
Summary of Interaction Effects of State and Trait Anxiety on Task-Switching Using Ordinary
Least Squares Regression
DV B SE 95% CI p
Switch costs (RT) 0.0451 0.0986 [0.2398, 0.1497] .648
Switch costs (accuracy) 0.0001 0.0000 [0.0002, 0.0000] .008
Switch costs (drift rate) 0.0013 0.0004 [0.0022, 0.0004] .004
Switch costs (nondecision time) 0.1221 0.0905 [0.3009, 0.0566] .179
Mixing costs (RT) 0.3166 0.1377 [0.5886, 0.0445] .023
Mixing costs (accuracy) 0.0000 0.0000 [0.0001, 0.0000] .234
Boundary separation for pure trials 0.0007 0.0003 [0.0012, 0.0002] .012
Boundary separation for repeat trials 0.0012 0.0004 [0.0019, 0.0005] .002
Boundary separation for switch trials 0.0013 0.0004 [0.0021, 0.0006] .000






































































































13ANXIETY, MIND WANDERING, AND TASK-SWITCHING
anxiety impairs task-switching because it allocates attentional re-
sources to internal threat-related stimuli such as worrisome
thoughts—that, in turn, result in the loss of attentional resources
for ongoing task-switching. Given that attentional resources are
distributed between concurrent task-switching and worrisome
thoughts, it is crucial to investigate how the intensity of worrisome
thoughts affects the allocation of cognitive resources. For instance,
worries about potential failure on an important exam (e.g., a
preemployment skills test) might require greater attentional re-
sources than worries about potential failure on a practice exam.
The different intensity of these worries, based on their potential
implications, would affect one’s performance to different degrees.
In view of this, future studies are warranted to consider the
intensity of worrisome thoughts in examining the mediating role of
TUT on the relation between anxiety and task-switching. Further,
it is important that future studies examine internal threat-related
distractors beyond worrisome thoughts.
Lastly, we found that WMC did not moderate the relation between
anxiety and task-switching performance. Although recent studies
have found that WMC attenuates the adverse effect of trait anxiety on
mathematical problem solving (Owens et al., 2014) and a memory
task in the dual-task paradigm (Johnson & Gronlund, 2009), we failed
to conceptually replicate the moderating effect of WMC on task-
switching performance. This suggests that WMC might not protect
individuals from impaired task-switching under anxiety. On the other
hand, it is possible that the positive role of WMC in attenuating the
Figure 6
Simple Slopes (i.e., Unstandardized Coefficients) of State Anxiety Predicting


































































































































































































































14 HARTANTO AND YANG
negative effect of anxiety is task specific. For instance, an interaction
between anxiety and WMC might only emerge when cognitive tasks
demand the ability to maintain task-relevant information in the face of
concurrent distractor interference, as in mathematical tests or dual
tasks with high memory load (Raghubar et al., 2010; Redick et al.,
2016). Given that task-switching paradigm relies more on an ability to
resist proactive interference (Wylie & Allport, 2000), which is dis-
tinguished from the ability to resist distractor interference (Friedman
et al., 2004), it is plausible that our findings of the null moderating
effect of WMC may be attributed to different aspects of inhibitory
control. Furthermore, although task-switching and WMC are often
categorized under the umbrella term of executive functions, studies
have demonstrated that task-switching costs (i.e., switch and mixing
costs) implicate many cognitive processes that are distinct from those
that underlie WMC (Miyake et al., 2000; Rubin & Meiran, 2005).
Therefore, future studies should investigate how task demands would
differently affect the moderating role of WMC in the relation between
anxiety and other executive processes beyond task-switching.
Our study is not without limitations. Given that it focused on
variations in naturally occurring state anxiety, the causality between
anxiety and task-switching was not well established because of the
lack of manipulation of state anxiety. Although most of our predic-
tions were theoretically driven, future studies that experimentally
manipulate state anxiety in the task-switching paradigm are war-
ranted. Furthermore, given that we used only the color-shape task, it
is important that future studies replicate our findings using other
variants of the task-switching paradigm. Using more than one task
would allow researchers to circumvent possible task impurity issues
in the task-switching paradigm (Miyake et al., 2000). Moreover, given
our findings of null associations of anxiety with boundary separation
in mixed blocks and pure blocks and the one between trait anxiety and
switch costs in RT, it is possible that our study may lack sufficient
power to detect significant relations. Nevertheless, it is worthy high-
lighting the fact that the sample size of our study (n  152) was larger
than most of the previous studies: Ansari et al. (2008; n  59);
Derakshan et al. (2009; n  61); Edwards et al. (2015; n  70);
Johnson and Gronlund (2009; n  50); and Owens et al. (2014; n 
96). Thus, these results should be interpreted with caution.
Further, one might raise a methodological concern regarding our
color-shape task. As the task used only two target stimuli and over-
lapping response mapping, a correct response for the shape task
should always be wrong for the color task and vice versa. Given this,
it is arguable that the use of only two stimuli may lead participants to
engage in an idiosyncratic strategy to simply reverse one’s response-
key mapping from one key to another (i.e., a response key mapping-
reversal strategy), instead of engaging in actual task-switching. How-
ever, this is unlikely for two reasons. First, the unpredictability of
switch trials in our task renders the response key mapping-reversal
strategy more inefficient, because the strategy requires that the par-
ticipant correctly guess the type of trial (e.g., repeat or switch) and
remember the preceding cue to reverse one’s response successfully on
a given trial. Second, given that our task cue always appeared before
the target stimulus and not together, engaging in normal task-
switching is easier and more efficient than simply reversing one’s
response keys while overriding the given task cue. In line with our
view, we have observed robust switch and mixing costs—that should
have been attenuated if the response key mapping-reversal strategy
was used—and no participants reported using any unique strategy that
was similar to the response key mapping-reversal strategy. Hence, we
conclude that the use of only two stimuli with overlapping response
key mapping does not invalidate the task used in our study.
In summary, this study elucidates several theoretical assumptions
and predictions on the relation between anxiety and task-switching.
Consistent with attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), we
demonstrate that the locus of impaired switch costs under anxiety lies
in task-set reconfiguration processes. We also find partial evidence for
anxious individuals’ use of compensatory strategies when performing
task-switching. Our finding of the association between anxiety and
mixing costs extends the literature by suggesting that anxiety affects
not only transient control of task-set reconfiguration, but also global
sustained control mechanisms in monitoring and maintaining two
competing task sets during task-switching. Our mediation analyses
indicate that the frequency of TUT does not mediate the adverse effect
of state anxiety on task-switching. Moreover, WMC does not mod-
erate the negative effect of anxiety on task-switching. Taken together,
these findings contribute to more comprehensive understanding of the
mechanisms that drive the relation between anxiety and task-
switching.
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Table A1
Zero-Order Correlations Among Cognitive Variables
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Working memory capacity (PCU) —
2. Switch costs (RT) .043 —
3. Switch costs (accuracy) .087 .146 —
4. Switch costs (binning) .056 .475 .841 —
5. Mixing costs (RT) .172 .321 .264 .273 —
6. Mixing costs (accuracy) .106 .012 .210 .359 .008 —
7. Mixing costs (binning) .175 .172 .100 .010 .768 .301 —
Note. PCU  partial-credit unit; RT  response time.






































































































18 HARTANTO AND YANG
